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Abstract
We investigate whether late redistribution programs that can be targeted
towards low income families can “dominate” early redistribution programs
that cannot be targeted due to information constraints. We use simple two-
period OLG models with heterogenous agents under six policy regimes: A
model calibrated to the U.S. economy (benchmark), two early redistribution
(lump sum) regimes, two (targeted) late redistribution regimes, and ﬁnally
a model without taxes and redistribution. Redistribution programs are ﬁn-
anced by a labor tax on the young and a capital tax on the old generation.
We argue that late redistribution, if the programs are small in size, can dom-
inate early redistribution in terms of welfare but not in terms of real output.
Better targeting of low income households cannot oﬀset savings distortions.
In addition we ﬁnd that optimal tax policy includes a positive capital tax
rate.
JEL Classiﬁcation: H20, H22
Keywords: Taxation Timing, Transfer Timing, Redistribution, Capital
Accumulation, Optimal Taxation, Capital Taxation.
1 Introduction
In recent years some long running government transfer programs have come under
attack. The unsuccessful privatization attempt of Social Security by the Bush II
administration is one such example. Since government run transfer programs are
ﬁnanced from the same pool of tax revenue, government transfer programs are
constantly reevaluated.1
∗I would like to thank Gerhard Glomm, Michael Kaganovich and Chung Tran for many helpful
discussions. Contact: Juergen Jung, Indiana University - Bloomington, Wylie Hall Rm 204, 100
S. Woodlawn, Bloomington, IN 47405-7104; Tel.: 812-345-9182; E-mail: juejung@indiana.edu
1Technically the social security system is independent of the government budget and therefore
independently ﬁnanced from, say, public education. However, there is no question that should
Social Security run out of funds, the government budget would be directly, or at least indirectly,
aﬀected.
1In this paper, we ask whether it is better to transfer to the young or to the
old generation and which generation should pay the bill? Obvious advantages of
transfers to the young generation are that human capital can be built up quicker
which has important growth eﬀects (e.g. Glomm and Ravikumar (1992)). Trans-
fers to the old might make sense because there is a certain insurance component
embedded in Social Security. In his defense of the U.S. Social Security system
Diamond (2004) gives a similar justiﬁcation of why transfers should occur late in
an agent’s life. In addition, he claims that annuity markets are not fairly prized
and that workers cannot sort out basic portfolio diversiﬁcation to eﬀectively self
insure.2
Both, early and late redistribution programs have negative eﬀects as well. Early
redistribution is not eﬃcient in insuring income shocks later in an individuals life,
as the above discussion already suggests. Late redistribution programs on the other
hand have strong adverse savings distortion eﬀects.
The question of transfers to the old vs. the young has an additional political
economy aspect, as the generations compete against each other for government
transfers and tax advantages. A recent literature investigates government run
transfer programs like social security or public education in terms of their political
implementability (e.g. Cooley and Soares (1999) Soares (2003), Conde-Ruiz and
Galasso (2004), Gradstein and Kaganovich (2004)).
From data we know that the U.S. spends roughly 38% of all transfers on the
adult population on the young generation aged 20 − 50 years old (see table 5).
A sizeable amount of these transfers are means tested. Rector, Kim and Watkins
(2007) classify these transfers between federal, state and local transfers. We present
their summary in table 4.
In this paper we ask the hypothetical question of whether a means tested re-
distribution program, that transfers to the old generation, is able to “dominate”
a transfer program that redistributes to the young generation. We address this
question in a highly stylized two period overlapping generations model with early
and late redistribution policies ﬁnanced by alternative tax rules. The idea is the
following:
If the policy maker redistributes early in an agent’s life, little is known about
the agent. Records on an agent’s ability, educational choices, health or related
lifestyle choices, income shocks etc. are either not known or not accessible. It
is therefore diﬃcult for the policy maker to target redistribution programs that
shift funds early in an agent’s life. Programs that fall into this category are public
education (FAFSA education credits depend on parents’ income situation and other
demographic factors), and to a lesser extent Medicaid, unemployment payments,
foodstamp programs etc.
Programs that redistribute late in an agents life-cycle have the advantage of
2Compare also Calvet, Campbell and Sodini (2006) who calculate the welfare costs of house-
hold investment mistakes using wealth and investment data from Sweden. They identify two main
ineﬃciencies in the ﬁnancial portfolio of Swedish households: underdiversiﬁcation of risky assets
and nonparticipation in risky asset markets. They ﬁnd that households with greater ﬁnancial
sophistication tend to invest more eﬃciently but also more aggressively, so that the welfare cost
of portfolio ineﬃciency is actually greater for these households.
2having more information about the agent available. Such programs are therefore
more suited for means testing. Information about agents is now available because
health and income shocks have been realized and publicly available records are
more complete (e.g. surveys and population statistics, divorce statistics etc.). The
two major programs that redistribute late in an agent’s lifetime are Social Security
and Medicare, to a certain extent also Medicaid.
In this paper we introduce a simple overlapping generations model where agents
live for two periods. Agents are heterogeneous with respect to their human capital
(ability) endowment. Agents work when young and retire when old. We then
postulate two extreme redistribution regimes. In the ﬁrst regime the government
transfers funds to agents when they are young. Since the government does not
yet know anything about the income situation of the agents, this will be simple
(non-targeted) lump-sum transfers.
In the second regime, the government redistributes to old agents only. The
government is then able to observe the income of old agents and can target trans-
fers. The targeting depends on savings and has distortive eﬀects that will partly
oﬀset the beneﬁt of targeting. We then compare the two regimes under varying
ﬁnancing options. Some of these regimes will allow for intergenerational transfers,
others will exclude them.
We ﬁnd that late redistribution, although it introduces direct savings distortions
into the model, can dominate early redistribution in terms of welfare. This result
will depend crucially on the overall size of the redistribution program and on the
level of targeting. It turns out that only for very small redistribution programs,
late redistribution dominates early redistribution in terms of welfare only. Late
redistribution cannot dominate early redistribution in terms of output. If the
programs become larger, direct savings distortions oﬀset the eﬃciency gains from
targeting and welfare falls below the early redistribution levels. We then calculate
the policy that maximizes aggregate welfare. We ﬁnd that relative to current U.S.
policy, optimal policy suggests to move more funds towards the young generation
and to increase capital taxes considerably.
The literature on redistribution is tremendously rich and a lot of emphasis has
been placed on eﬃcient redistribution policies, optimal taxation and the public
provision of education, unemployment beneﬁts and retirement pensions. There is
a large body of literature studying these redistribution programs.
The classic contributions to the optimal tax literature are Mirrlees (1971) and
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). Kocherlakota (2005) surveys the literature on dy-
namic extensions of the original Mirrlees model. Important contributions to this
literature are Chamley (1986), Judd (1985), and Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997).
One important ﬁndings in these papers is that capital should not be taxed. Hub-
bard and Judd (1986), Aiyagari (1995), and Imrohoroglu (1998) ﬁnds that if house-
holds face tight borrowing constraints or cannot insure against idiosyncratic income
shocks, then a positive capital tax cannot be ruled out in the optimum. Alvarez
et al. (1992), Garriga (2000), Erosa and Gervais (2002), and Conesa, Kitao and
Krueger (forthcoming) analyze this question in life cycle models and overlapping
generations economies and conclude that a positive capital tax is optimal partly
3caused by increasing income proﬁles. A capital tax can then help redistribute from
high income cohorts to lower income cohorts in the absence of a progressive labor
income tax. Additional papers that address optimal taxation in overlapping gen-
erations models together with government commitment and information problems
have been analyzed in Brett (1998), Blackorby and Brett (2000), and Pirttila and
Tuomola (2001).
We next point to literature that focuses more on the redistribution programs
and less on taxation. Seshadri and Yuki (2004) study various forms of redistribu-
tion and their eﬀect on the distributions of earnings and consumption. Braeuniger
(2004) studies a model that highlights interaction between Social Security, unem-
ployment and growth in a labor search market environment. Bhattacharya and
Reed (2003) introduce a search market explanation for how pension programs can
increase the eﬃciency of the labor market. Glomm and Kaganovich (2003) focus
on distributional eﬀects of public versus private ﬁnancing of education and Social
Security whereas Gradstein and Kaganovich (2004) analyze the impact of aging
on the public funding of education. Corneo and Marquardt (2000) study the in-
teraction between an unfunded pension program and an unemployment insurance
program in the presence of a labor market with union wage-setting. Finally, Boldrin
and Montes (2004) show how public ﬁnancing of education and pensions can lead
to a complete market allocation. A number of papers is dedicated to risk shar-
ing among generations under pay-as-you-go (PAYG) Social Security systems (e.g.
Hassler and Lindbeck (1998)) or the value of information on production econom-
ies under uncertainty and its role on income inequality (e.g. Eckwert and Zilcha
(2001) and Eckwert and Zilcha (2003)). None of these papers focuses on the timing
of public redistribution programs and the theoretical informational advantage of
late redistribution programs.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. The next section outlines the
model and deﬁnes equilibrium. Section 3 describes how we solve the model and
presents the numerical solution algorithm. Section 4 presents the calibration of the
model to U.S. data. In section 5 we conduct policy analysis by changing the size
of the distribution programs as well as the targeting levels of late redistribution
programs. Section 6 discusses optimal tax policy. Section 7 concludes the paper.
The Appendix contains all tables and ﬁgures.
2 The Model
2.1 Demographics and Heterogeneity
We consider a two-period overlapping generations economy with heterogeneous
agents. There is no population growth and the size of the population is normalized
to one in each period. Agents do not face uncertainty of survival into the second
period. Agents diﬀer with respect to their individual ability, θ
i
t. We assume that
θ
i
t is an iid random variable that is distributed according to a time invariant dis-




,where θ,  θ ∈ R+, and i indexes
4all agents. We will drop the i superscript in order to not clutter the notation. An
agent’s eﬀective unit of labor zt depends on her ability level θ. For simplicity we
assume the identity function to describe the relation between innate ability and
eﬀective unit of labor, so that
zt (θ) = θ.
Agents are endowed with one unit of time that they can either consume as leis-
ure lt or supply as labor (1 − lt) earning wages. The eﬀective human capital per
individual that enters the production process is
ht (θ) = (1 − lt)zt (θ).
2.2 Preferences and Technology




















t+1 are consumption when young and old, lt is leisure, a1 is the
preference weight on consumption, a2 is the preference weight on leisure, σ is then
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and β is the time preference
factor. We assume that a1 + a2 = 1.






where parameters A > 0, 0 < α < 1, Yt is total output, Kt is the aggregate capital
stock of physical capital, and Ht is the aggregate capital stock of human capital
in period t Physical capital Kt will be ﬁnanced by the aggregate savings of the
previous generation St−1 and depreciates each period at rate δ.
2.3 Government
The government collects taxes and gives transfers to young and old agents. The
government cannot issue debt and has to balance its budget every period. Gov-
ernment consumption is set equal to zero. The government collects a ﬂat rate
labor tax τL from the young generation and a ﬂat rate capital tax τK from the old














In the following we will distinguish two government redistribution programs that
are ﬁnanced with tax revenue. The two programs will diﬀer with respect to when
redistribution takes place in an agent’s life. The ﬁrst program gives lump sum
transfers to young agents, whereas the second program is a late redistribution
5program that can target transfers to the old generation according to individuals’
wealth levels.
Since we assume that the government cannot observe the ability or skill of
an agent at the beginning of her life, early transfers T e
t have to be lump-sum by
assumption. The government uses an exogenous fraction λ of its total tax income
over the length of a period (approximately thirty years in this OLG setting) to pay
for this program. The government budget constraint for the early transfer case is
T
e
t = λ × Taxt. (4)
The second program gives transfers exclusively to old agents based on the
agents’ wealth. Since we assume that the government can observe the wealth
levels (and ability) of agents when they are old, it is now possible to target trans-
fers according to the level of wealth. The lower the wealth level, the more transfers




t (θ) = max[a − bRtst−1 (θ),0], (5)
where Rtst−1 (θ) is wealth (from savings plus interest net of capital taxes) in the
second period, a represents the government enforced maximum transfer, and b
captures the degree of means-testing of the government transfer program. As
wealth Rtst−1 (θ) increases, transfers decrease at rate b. The parameters satisfy
0 ≤ a and 0 ≤ b. The government uses the residual tax income, that is fraction







max[a − bRtst−1 (θ),0]dF (θ) = (1 − λ) × Taxt. (6)
2.4 Households
Agents know the government policy and the late transfer function. In addition
they are borrowing constrained. They maximize
max


































0 < lt ≤ 1, st ≥ 0, (10)
where ct and ct+1 are consumption when young and old, lt is leisure when young,
st is savings, zt (θ) is the eﬃciency unit of labor as a function of innate ability θ, so
that (1 − l)z (θ) becomes eﬀectively supplied human capital, which we denote by
ht (θ). All household choices are functions of the exogenous realization of innate
ability θ.
62.5 Firms









t − qtKt − wtHt
 
, (11)
taking (qt,wt) as given.
2.6 Equilibrium
Deﬁnition 1 A competitive equilibrium is a collection of sequences of distributions
of individual household decisions {ct (θ),ct+1 (θ),st (θ)}
∞
t=0 for all agents θ ∈ Θ,
sequences of aggregate stocks of physical capital {Kt}
∞
t=0 , sequences of factor prices
{wt,qt,Rt}
∞












(i) the sequence {ct (θ),ct+1 (θ),st (θ)}
∞
t=0 solves the maximization problem of
the household (7) for each agent θ ∈ Θ,
(ii) factor prices are determined by





wt = (1 − α)Y
j














(iii) capital markets clear, so that aggregate capital stocks are given by







zt (θ)(1 − lt (θ))dF (θ),
(iv) commodity markets clear
Ct−1 + Ct + Kt+1 = Yt + (1 − δ)Kt, (15)
(v) and the respective government budget constraints (4) and (6) hold.
3 Solving the Model
3.1 Households
An individual agent’s maximization problem depends on whether she receives
transfers when old or not. This will of course depend on the agent’s initial ability
7level which in turn determines her income. We will have to calculate a threshold
ability level θ
∗ that determines whether an agent is “poor enough” to receive means
tested transfers when old. Whenever the initial ability/income level is below the
threshold, θ < θ
∗, then second period wealth is low enough in order for late trans-
fers to be positive, T l (θ) > 0. Whenever the initial ability is equal or above this
threshold, θ ≥ θ
∗, then late transfers will be zero, T l (θ) = 0. Before substituting
the budget constraints we ﬁrst ﬁnd the optimal relation between consumption and





















The ratio of marginal utilities has to equal the price ratio when solutions for leisure













We can now express leisure in terms of consumption as
lt = min(Θtct,1), (16)
where Θt =
(a2/a1)
(1−τL)wtzt(θ). Using the household budget constraint for the young
individual we have




wt (1 − lt)zt (θ) + T
e
t .
We can then substitute out leisure using (16)











































wtzt (θ) + T
e
t ,
which we rewrite as




wtzt (θ) + T
e
t ,
where pc = 1 + a2
a1. Finally, we substitute leisure out of the preferences using (16)














8where χt = Θ
a2(1−σ)

















































After substituting the budget constraints into the respective objective functions
we get the following ﬁrst order conditions
θ < θ
∗ :
χt (a1 + a2)
pc
  
1 − τL 









χt (a1 + a2)
pc
  
1 − τL 







Since we assume that the preference parameters on consumption and leisure sum
up to one, i.e. a1 + a2 = 1, the powers on the left and right hand side are equal.
We can now express savings directly as
θ < θ
∗ : st (θ) =
  
1 − τL 
















∗ : st (θ) =
  
1 − τL 














Now χt is a function of the random variable θ. The threshold θ, that determines
whether the household will receive targeted transfers when old is determined by
the payout function (5) and can be expressed as
0 ≤ a − bRt+1st (θ).
9Using expression (19) this threshold condition becomes
  
1 − τL 

























1 − τL 


















We use this notation to indicate the threshold ability levels that fall inside the




.3 Whenever the threshold ability level would lie
outside of the support of θ, we have corner cases that indicate that either all
agents will receive late transfers (ˆ θ < θ) or none of the agents will receive late
transfers
 
ˆ θ > θ
 
. The deﬁnition of threshold ability θ
∗ accounts for all of these











  θ, if ˆ θ >   θ,
θ, if ˆ θ < θ,
so that savings can be written as
st (θ) =

    



































if θ ≥ θ
∗.
(21)
We use the maximum notation to indicate that agents are borrowing constrained
and that savings can not become negative. Finally, we need to check the corner
case for leisure l = 1. Preferences of the young agent will then reduce to


























ct + st = T
e
t ,
ct+1 = (1 − b)Rt+1st + a.
3We use a lognormal distribution for our calibration. We truncate the lognormal distribution
below and above for computational reasons. The lower and upper bounds are set wide enough,
























t is a similar threshold as the one above which determines whether the
income (from transfer income only) of the young is large enough, so that they have
to much wealth in order to receive transfers when old. Substituting the budget






t : a1 (T
e
t − st)






t : a1 (T
e
t − st)
a1(1−σ)−1 = βRt+1 (Rt+1st)
−σ .
Here the powers do not match up anymore. We therefore cannot express savings









β (1 − b)Rt+1
((1 − b)Rt+1st + a)





t : F (st) ≡ a1 (T
e
t − st)
a1(1−σ)−1 − βRt+1 (Rt+1st)
−σ = 0. (24)
In this case savings does not have a common power, unless a1 = 1. So that we
need to use a nonlinear equation solver to solve for st (θ). After solving for savings
we can calculate the threshold transfer level T e∗ that determines whether the old
agent receives a targeted transfer. The criterion is again derived from the payout
formula for late transfers, expression (5) and can be written as





This is again an implicit function that determines the threshold transfer level
G(T
e∗




t ) = 0.
3.2 Government

















t dF (θt−1) = λTax, (25)
  θ∗
θ
[a − bRtst−1 (θt−1)]dF (θt−1) = (1 − λ)Tax, (26)
11where the integral on the left hand side of expression (26) is over the fraction of
the old population that has low enough ability endowment θ in order to be entitled
to late transfers. This expression simpliﬁes to
  θ∗
θ
a × dF (θt−1) − bRtK1,t = (1 − λ)Tax. (27)
The government has to choose a mixture of parameters λ,a,b,τL and τK such that
equations (25) and (26) hold.
3.3 Algorithm
We cannot get closed form solutions for this problem. We therefore use the follow-
ing algorithm and solve the model numerically on a computer.
Algorithm 1 1.





that an individual ability θi ∈  θ
3. Create a vector of population mass per ability level using the lognormal dis-




4. Calculate total population size N =
 
Θ  n
5. Guess starting value for capital K
6. Start loop:
(a) Derive factor prices q,w, and R using ﬁrm ﬁrst order conditions
(b) Solve the household problem for each household i:
i. solve for savings s(θ)
ii. if s < 0, set savings s = 0
iii. if a − bRs(θ) < 0 solve again for savings using the equation for
case: θ ≥ θ
∗ in expression (21)
iv. if s < 0, set savings s = 0
v. calculate consumption ct and leisure lt
vi. if lt > 1, set lt = 1 and solve again for savings using the maximiz-
ation problem for l = 1 in (22) from which we derived the implicit
function for savings, expression (23)
vii. if s < 0, set savings s = 0
viii. if a − bRs(T e) < 0, solve again for savings using the expressions
for case: T e ≥ Te∗ in expression (24)
ix. if s < 0, set savings s = 0
12x. calculate consumption when young ct
xi. calculate consumption when old ct+1
(c) Aggregate savings using population mass vector:
K




Θ s(θ) ×  n
(d) Clear government budget constraints (25), (26), and (27) for either:
a,b,τL, or τK.
(e) Calculate error: err = abs(Knew − K)
(f) Consistency check of aggregate resource constraint (15)
(g) if err > tolerance, repeat from step (a) with K = 0.5Knew + 0.5K
4 Calibration
4.1 Demographics and Heterogeneity
We use data on the lifetime income distribution reported in Fullerton and Rogers
(1993) to calibrate the ability or skill distribution F (θ). Fullerton and Rogers
(1993) use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for the years 1970-87
and calculate mean lifetime income before and after taxes/transfers for each decile.
We use these deciles of the after tax/transfers ﬁgures reported in table 1 to get
point estimates for the mean and standard deviation of a lognormal distribution.4
We use an iterative procedure to estimate the parameters for the mean and
the standard deviation of this distribution. We ﬁrst draw 500,000 lognormally
distributed random numbers. We then calculate the deciles and compare them
to the deciles reported in column two of table 1. We then minimize the absolute
distance of the simulated deciles and the deciles in the table by adjusting the
appropriate mean and standard deviation parameters   and σ. Point estimates
for parameters   and σ are reported in table 6. To check the sensitivity of our
results with respect to the functional form of our income distribution, we also ﬁt a
gamma distribution to the mean income data per decile. We report both estimated
lifetime income distributions in the top panel of ﬁgure 1. The bottom panel plots
the lifetime income ﬁgures per decile of our estimates against the estimates from
Fullerton and Rogers (1993).
The estimated lognormal distribution represents the lifetime income distribu-
tion. However, for our model we need the distribution of innate ability θ. We ﬁrst
normalize wages w to one picking the appropriate total factor productivity A. The
term wh(θ) is then equal to θ and represents wage earnings over the 30 years of
active work life, or period one in our model. From the literature on earnings and
income distribution (e.g. Lillard (1977)) we know that the earnings distribution
4Fernandez and Rogerson (2003) use the same data for calibrating their model of education
ﬁnance systems. They ﬁnd that the pretax lifetime income distribution is very similar to the post
tax and transfers distribution of lifetime income.
13is more concentrated than income or wealth distribution.5 We therefore decided
to use the lognormal distribution as our benchmark model since it is more con-
centrated than the gamma distribution. Still our estimated lognormal distribution
is the distribution of lifetime income and not of lifetime earnings. We therefore
conduct sensitivity analysis on parameters   and σ.
We calibrate the lowest lifetime income individual as θ = $1,000 and the highest
lifetime income individual at   θ = $5,000,000 which is well above the mean lifetime
income of $1.7 million for the 98−100 percentile in Fullerton and Rogers (1993).6
4.2 Preferences and Technology
We pick total factor productivity A to normalize wages to one. The capital share
of production α = 0.36 as in Kydland and Prescott (1982), the annual depreciation
rate is δ = 8% which falls well in between the estimates in Nadiri and Prucha (1996)
who report numbers between 5.9% − 12%. The time preference rate is β = 0.94.
Parameter σ determines the risk aversion of the household and is set σ = 2.5.
Parameter β and σ together are set to match the capital output ratio K/Y = 2.98
and the annual interest rate r = 4.1%.7 These are standard values and can be
found in the NIPA accounts.
The preference parameters for consumption and leisure are restricted to sum
to one, a1 +a2 = 1. We then chose a2 = 0.57 (the share on leisure) so that average
lifetime labor supply equals 0.375 which is close to 0.374 which has been estimated
by Gomes, Kotlikoﬀ and Viceira (2007). The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion in
consumption is the given by −cucc
uc = σa1+1−a1 = 1.645, so that the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is 0.61. We summarize the calibration parameters in table
6.
4.3 Government
We next calibrate the shares of labor tax income and capital tax income from
federal, state and local tax revenues. Table 2 contains data on tax revenue from the
U.S. Census and the IRS of ﬁscal year 2004. Table 3 translates these revenues into
labor tax revenue and capital tax revenue in the model. We disregard consumption
and sales tax revenues and other government income, since they are not part of our
model. We ﬁnd that 75% of tax income comes from labor taxes and 25% comes
from capital taxes. Total tax revenue from labor and capital taxes amounts to
21.4% of GDP. We target this fraction of GDP to be the size of government in our
5Compare also Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez and Rios-Rull (2003) for new estimates on annual
earnings, income and wealth distributions in the U.S. They do not calculate the lifetime earnings
distribution.
6The actual distribution that we use here is a truncated lognormal distribution. The truncation
is required for computational/numerical reasons and do not aﬀect the results of the paper as the
the agent mass outside of the truncation is close to zero.
7It is clear that in a general equilibrium model every parameter aﬀects all equilibrium variables.
Here we associate parameters with those equilibrium variables that are the most quantitatively
aﬀected.
14model. The appropriate labor tax turns out to be τL = 27% and the capital tax is
τK = 15.5%.
Table 4 contains data on government spending of ﬁscal year 2004. We use
these data to calibrate the relative share of total tax revenue going into early
vs. late transfers as governed by parameter λ. In table 5 we classify government
transfers into transfers to the young population aged 20 − 50 and transfers to the
old population aged 50 − 80. We conclude that 38% of all government transfers
to adults (age 20 − 80) goes to the young population (age 20 − 50), whereas the
residual 62% goes to the old (age 50−80). Hence we set λ = 0.38 in the benchmark
economy.
The main contributing programs to the old are Social Security ($496 Billion)
and Medicare ($296 Billion). When splitting Medicaid into transfers to young and
old we use information from Kaiser (2005) and allocate 31% of Medicaid expendit-
ures to the old generation. We then split the category “Health other” in table in
a similar fashion. The split for housing assistance is provided in Kochera (2001)
(66.6% to young generation) and the split of the foodstamp program is detailed in
Kassner (2001) (91% to young generation). Transfers to primary and secondary
education are excluded because we only model the population from age 20 upwards.
For the benchmark targeting program we choose a = 0.22 (˜$364,800) as the
ﬁxed portion of the late transfer This translates into a maximum monthly transfer
of $1,000. The parameter that governs the targeting rate is set as b = 0.2. There
are multiple combinations of a and b that would satisfy the government budget
requirement of expression (26). We think this is a good parameterization as people
without any savings will receive a $1,000 monthly beneﬁt. According to Olsen and
Hoﬀmeyer (2002) the special minimum beneﬁt out of Social Security amounts to
$500 on average per month (as of February 2002). If one factors in that this number
is about $2,000 below the annual poverty income level, we think it is reasonable
that individual with zero savings get an amount larger than the minimum social
security beneﬁt. In addition, our late redistribution program is not only Social
Security but includes are transfers to the old, like Medicaid, as well.
5 Policy Analysis of Diﬀerent Tax Policy Pro-
grams
5.1 Comparison of Tax Policy Programs
We present our results for a production economy under six speciﬁcations: (i) the
U.S. economy denoted US, (ii) early redistribution to the young generation ﬁn-
anced by taxes on wage income of the current young generation denoted EL, (iii)
early redistribution to the young generation ﬁnanced by taxes on interest income
of the current old generation denoted ES, (iv) late redistribution to the old gen-
eration ﬁnanced by taxes on wage income of the current young generation denoted
LL, (v) late redistribution to the old generation ﬁnanced by taxes on interest in-
come of the current old generation denoted LS, and (vi) no redistribution denoted
15NR. We summarize the parameter settings for these ﬁve cases as:
United States (US) : τ
L = 27%, τ
K = 15.5%, λ = 0.38
Early transfer with labor tax (EL) : τ
L > 0, τ
K = 0, λ = 1
Early transfer with capital tax (ES) : τ
L = 0, τ
K > 0, λ = 1
Late transfer with labor tax (LL) : τ
L > 0, τ
K = 0, λ = 0
Late transfer with capital tax (LS) : τ
L = 0, τ
K > 0, λ = 0
No transfer, no taxes (NR) : τ
L = τ
K = 0
5.2 Size of Redistribution Program
Our ﬁrst experiment is to ﬁnd out whether late redistribution programs can ever
dominate early redistribution programs in terms of aggregate welfare and output.
We therefore compare the diﬀerent regimes adjusting the tax rates that ﬁnance
them. In the case of regimes EL and LL we choose labor taxes in the range
between 0 − 20% and for regimes ES and LS we use capital tax rates in the
same range from 0 − 20%. These tax rates are the only source of funding for the
redistribution programs in the respective regimes and therefore directly determine
the size of these programs.
Figures 2 to 4 present the results. In order to relate the four distribution re-
gimes EL, LL, ES, and LS to our benchmark calibration we also plot the original
calibration of the U.S. economy denoted US as well as the no redistribution re-
gime with zero taxes NR. For the late redistribution regimes we choose targeting
parameter b = 0.2 and let the second targeting parameter a adjust to clear the
government budget constraint as we alter the tax rates. Technology and agent
heterogeneity is identical for all regimes. Note that the size of the economies of the
diﬀerent regimes are equal and our experiments are therefore not revenue neutral.
Our goal is simply to ﬁnd ranges for tax rates where late redistribution programs
outperform early redistribution programs in terms of welfare and output.
Figure 2 presents the aggregate economy. In panel [1] we see that aggregate
output of early redistribution ﬁnanced with a labor tax, EL is almost identical
to the no redistribution case NR. The slight diﬀerence between the two cases is
explained by the labor distortion caused by the labor tax.8 Early redistribution
ﬁnanced by a savings tax on the old generation, ES, produces the largest steady
state output (red dotted line). We see from panel [2] that in this case aggregate
8It can be shown that with inelastic labor supply the to cases, EL and NR will be identical as
tax revenues collected from the young are returned to them immediately in a lump sum fashion
so that aggregate savings will be identical. The only diﬀerence then is in terms of welfare as the
lump sum tax provides some redistribution from the rich to the poor.
16savings is the highest and therefore the level of output dominates the other redis-
tribution regimes. This is true for all sizes of government, τ = 0 to τ = 20%. The
only program that grows monotonically with increasing the tax rates is the ES
program. Here the additional funds collected via the capital tax are shifted to the
young. As labor is not taxed the distortion in labor supply are relatively small and
the larger stock in physical capital ensures that output increases. The early redis-
tribution case ﬁnanced by a labor tax also exhibits an increase in the savings rate
of physical capital. However, the increasing labor tax rate causes a strong decrease
in labor supply that more than oﬀsets the increase in physical capital. Therefore
output for the EL (green dotted line) drops as the redistribution program becomes
larger.
The volume of redistribution V R, or government size, is presented in panel [3]
of ﬁgure 2 We deﬁne V R as the total amount of funds collected by the government
in the steady state which can be written as



















Lwh(θ)dF (θ) = τ
L (1 − α)Y,




Kqs(θ)dF (θ) = τ
KαY,
NR : V R = 0,
for the six cases considered. We see from panel [3] that the early redistribution
with taxes on labor, EL, generates the largest volume of redistribution in absolute
terms. Keep in mind that the size of government as a fraction of GDP is identical
to τL(1 − α) for the regimes using the labor tax (EL,LL) and equal to τKα for
regimes using the capital tax (ES,LS). It is now easy to see that for identical tax
rates τL = τK the labor tax ﬁnanced programs (EL,LL) will always have a larger
government as percentage of GDP since (1 − α) > α given our calibration. This
translates into larger V R in levels for EL and LL as well, despite the fact that the
early redistribution program with capital taxes, ES, produces the largest economy.
The results of aggregate labor presented in panel [4] of ﬁgure 2 have a straight-
forward interpretation. Labor supply is lowest for the regimes that redistribute
early as income from early transfers directly rivals income from working. The more
income agents receive while they are in their active work period, the less labor they
are willing to supply. Panels [5] and [6] plot the interest rate and the wage rates
respectively. Late redistribution regimes produce larger interest rates and smaller
wage rates. This is directly related to the fact that late redistribution programs are
smaller economies which puts them on the steeper area of the production function
surface. Since interest rates are equal to the slopes of the production surface at
the respective equilibrium points, the the interest rates turn out to be larger for
the late redistribution programs. Labor supply in early redistribution programs
is lower than in late redistribution programs for reasoned mentioned earlier. In
the optimum that means again that at the equilibrium points, the production sur-
face for early redistribution programs is steeper along the labor dimension. This
17directly results in higher wages for early redistribution regimes. An alternative
interpretation is the increased value for leisure due to the extra income from early
redistribution. Companies have to compensate workers more in order to attract
labor.
Finally, panels [7] and [8] plot the targeting parameters a and b. Parameter a
adjusts endogenously to changes in taxes whereas b is held ﬁxed at the original
0.2. We see that as we increase the tax rate in the late redistribution regimes the
lump sum transfers a increase as the government budget has to stay balanced. This
results in more generous late transfer schemes. Incidentally, as taxes increase the
size of early redistribution programs increases as well in order to clear the budget
constraint of the government. These results are also depicted in panel [3] and have
been discussed earlier.
From the ﬁrst ﬁgure we conclude that late redistribution programs can never
dominate early redistribution programs in terms of output. Early transfers work
as an "engine of growth" and the larger the early redistribution program is, the
larger stock of physical capital becomes. If distortions in the labor market do
not completely oﬀset these increases in physical capital accumulation, the entire
economy will grow (see regime ES, red dotted line). Similar results for OLG
models have been reported in Jones and Manuelli (1992). OLG models have the
feature that the young generation has to buy the entire capital stock from the old
generation. If income of the young generation is too low, then the young cannot
aﬀord to buy an ever increasing capital stock and growth cannot happen. Jones
and Manuelli (1992) ﬁnd that income taxes (even taxes on capital) that can be
used to ﬁnance transfers to the young generation, will allow the young to buy an
ever increasing capital stock and economic growth is possible. We abstract from
growth in our model, but a similar mechanism ensures that early redistribution
programs produce larger economies.
We next turn our attention to welfare analysis and investigate whether late
redistribution programs can dominate early redistribution programs in terms of
welfare. We ﬁrst deﬁne lifetime utility of an agent type θ as
U (θ) = u(c
y (θ),l(θ)) + βu(c
o(θ)).
Aggregate welfare is then deﬁned as the aggregate lifetime utilities of all individuals
born directly into the steady state. Aggregate welfare therefore is
W =
    θ
θ
U (θ)dF (θ). (28)
Figure 3 presents aggregate welfare in panel [1] and lifetime utility of a low income
individual in panel [2]. From panel [1] we see that aggregate welfare is an increasing
function of the size of the redistribution program for the early transfer regimes EL
and ES. This again reﬂects the growth generating eﬀects of early transfers in OLG
models. The aggregate welfare of the late redistribution regime is non-monotonic.
For very small transfer programs the savings distortions are very low and the
18redistributive eﬀect of the targeting late redistribution will dominate. Aggregate
welfare levels of late redistribution programs also dominate those of their early
redistribution counterparts. However, this is only the case for programs that can
be ﬁnanced with a ﬂat tax rate on labor or capital smaller than 3%. For late
redistribution programs larger than that savings distortions become too strong
and aggregate welfare levels begin to drop. We see that poor individuals beneﬁt
the most from targeted late redistribution if the program is kept very small.
Finally, ﬁgure 4 contrasts lifetime utility levels of diﬀerent income groups by
lifetime-income quartiles (panels [1]−[4]) as well as the Gini coeﬃcient of household
lifetime income. As one would expect, the low income groups tend to beneﬁt from
larger redistribution programs, whereas high income groups lose. The program
that does worst in terms of welfare is the late redistribution case ﬁnanced via a
labor tax, LL. This regime exhibits a dual distortion. The savings distortion
from late transfers are augmented with labor supply distortions from taxing labor.
Therefore welfare for almost all income groups is decreasing in the size of the
redistribution program.9 Regime ES (red dotted line) increases welfare of almost
all groups as the size of the program becomes larger. Even the highest quartile
experiences some welfare improvement over the no tax (NR) case. One reason is
the high redistributive power of this program as can be induced from the low Gini
coeﬃcient in panel [6] of ﬁgure 4. Regime ES redistributes strongly without the
adverse labor distortions that regime EL incorporates. This explains the relative
dominance of regime ES over all measures discussed.
We conclude that late redistribution programs can dominate early redistribu-
tion programs in terms of welfare only when the size of the redistribution is kept
very small.
5.3 Changing the Targeting Rate of Redistribution
In our next set of experiments we investigate how an increased targeting rate for
late redistribution programs (via parameter b) can ensure that the late redistri-
bution program stays small. We again compare late redistribution programs and
early redistribution programs. In these sets of experiments we ﬁx targeting para-
meter a at a very small level a = 0.05 (˜ $197,159). We need to ﬁx this lump-sum
component of the late redistribution program to be small because otherwise the
required tax rates to ﬁnance the program would be very large and late redistribu-
tion programs would always be dominated by early redistribution programs. We
do not re-calibrate any of the other parameters.
Figures 5 and 6 report the results of these experiments.
We ﬁrst look at how aggregate output changes as we increase the targeting rate
of late redistribution programs b. As we change b we have to think which other gov-
ernment parameter do we want to adjust. Since we already ﬁxed a at a level of 0.05
the only other parameters left are the labor tax rate τL for the regimes ﬁnanced
by labor taxes (EL,LL) and the capital tax rate τK for regimes ﬁnance by capital
taxes (ES,LS). We see that as we increase b and the late redistribution programs
9The only exception is the very low income group as reported in panel [2] of ﬁgure 4.
19become more targeted, the necessary taxes to ﬁnance them can be reduced (com-
pare panel [7] in ﬁgure 5. This endogenous adjustment happens automatically for
late redistribution programs due to budget balancing. In order to compare the late
redistribution regimes to the early redistribution regimes we will set the tax rates
of the early redistribution regime equal to the endogenously adjusting tax rate of
the late redistribution regime. So the labor tax rate for EL is set equal to the
endogenously adjust labor tax rate of regime LL, whereas the capital tax rate of
regime ES is set equal to the endogenously adjusting capital tax rate of regime
LS (see also panel [8] in ﬁgure 5).
From panel [1] in ﬁgure 5 we see that the late redistribution regimes become
more targeted and the respective volume of redistribution decreases, output in-
creases. The opposite is true for the early redistribution programs. If the tax rates
of early redistribution programs mirror the decrease of their late redistribution
counterparts, the "engine of growth" of early transfers begins to stall and output
declines. In terms of output we get the same result as before. Late redistribution
programs will always be dominated by early redistribution programs, no matter
how targeted late redistribution program become.
In terms of welfare the picture changes again. Figure 6 shows that as the tar-
geting of late redistribution increases and the programs become smaller, aggregate
welfare in these regimes increases, due to smaller distortions and more aggressive
redistribution. On the other hand, as we adjust the size of early redistribution
programs at the same rate as the late redistribution programs we see that wel-
fare decreases for regime EL and ES. There is a threshold targeting parameter
around b = 0.14 after which programs are small enough that the late redistribu-
tion regimes start dominating the early redistribution regimes in terms of aggregate
welfare. The eﬀects are more pronounced for low income individuals as can be seen
in panel [2] of ﬁgure 6. For low income groups the targeting threshold after which
the dominance switches from early to late redistribution programs is much smaller
at b = 10.
We therefore conclude that more targeted programs, that can therefore be kept
small in size are able to dominate early redistribution programs in terms of aggreg-
ate welfare but not in terms of output.
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
We conduct the same set of experiments for a model without borrowing constraints
and also for a model with inelastic labor supply. Our results are robust to both
extensions. However, in the case with inelastic labor supply the late redistribution
programs have an even harder time to dominate the early redistribution programs.
The reason is that early redistribution programs suﬀer more in general from dis-
tortions in the labor market and once we turn those oﬀ there is only a very small
region left where late redistribution programs can dominate early redistribution
programs.
Our results are also robust to changes in the discount factor. We tried discount
factors in the range of β = [0.94,...,0.988] and found that small sized late redistri-
20bution programs can dominate early redistribution programs in terms of welfare.10
With larger discount factors even somewhat larger late redistribution programs
can dominate the early ones.
6 Optimal Tax Policy
We deﬁne optimal tax policy as a set of government policy parameters a,b,τL,τK,
and λ that maximize total welfare (28) such that consumers still solve their maxim-
ization problem and the conditions for competitive equilibrium hold. Total welfare
is deﬁned as the equally weighted sum of the lifetime utilities of all individuals who
are newly born into the steady state. More formally, the government maximizes
the utilitarian welfare function
max
{a,b,τL,τK,λ}
    θ
θ
[u(c
y (θ),l(θ)) + βu(c
o (θ))]dF (θ)
s.t.
(4),(6),(12) − (15),(17),(18),(23), and (24).
We report our results in table 8.
Our ﬁrst ﬁnding, shown in table 8 as model M1, is that using the most general
version of our model with heterogeneity, elastic labor supply, and non-separable
utilities the optimal government transfer and tax policy for the U.S. economy is:
a = 0.34 (˜$436,700), b = 1.05, τL = 30.6%, τK = 100%, and λ = 0.85. Compared
to the original calibration of the U.S. economy our model implies that transfers to
the young should be increased from currently 38% of all tax revenue to 85%. In
addition, labor taxes should increase slightly from 27% to 30.6% and capital taxes
should increase from 15.5% to 100%. In addition, the targeting rate increases from
b = 0.20 to b = 1.05, so that means testing becomes much more aggressive.
This policy increases steady state capital stock by factor three, reduces labor
supply from 36.7% to 29.0% and increases output by 50%. We interpret this result
as the Jones and Manuelli (1992) ﬁnding that transfers to the young generation
can increase output signiﬁcantly. The increase in welfare is a direct result of the
higher income and the higher consumption of leisure. Note also that capital taxes
are extremely large and positive. We will give the intuition for this result in the
next section.
As in Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) and Jones and Manuelli (1992) the optimal
tax policy described above is not welfare enhancing in a Paretian sense as the utility
of the initial old generation as well as the utility of the high income earners will be
lower with increasing tax rates. Also, our concentration on steady states misses the
costs imposed on transitional generations who have to build up the capital stock
which comes at the expense of their consumption.11
10Annual discount factors β translate into per period discount factors as βperiod = β
30. The
range of per period discount factors is accordingly βperiod = [0.1563,...,0.6961].
11Apart from computational diﬃculties that transitions would imply, we would like to compare
our results to the existing literature on optimal taxation which is concentrated on steady state
analysis.
216.1 Positive Capital Tax Rate
Positive capital tax rates are not unusual in overlapping generations economies as
has been shown in the literature (e.g. Ordover and Phelps (1975), Atkinson and
Sandmo (1980), Hubbard and Judd (1986), Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987), Alvarez
et al. (1992), Aiyagari (1995), Imrohoroglu (1998), Garriga (2000), Erosa and
Gervais (2002), Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (forthcoming), and others). Some of
the model features that ensure a positive capital tax rate are borrowing constraints,
increasing eﬃciency proﬁles, and agent income heterogeneity within age cohorts.
We can show that none of these features are essential to achieve a positive capital
tax rate as the optimal government ﬁnancing rule.
In order to give more intuition we use a simpliﬁed version of our model, where
agents supply labor inelastically, they are homogenous within their age cohort,
and capital and labor taxes are levied to ﬁnance an exogenously given government
consumption equal to Tax > 0. We can derive the steady state capital stock as
K =
 








and after substituting the government budget constraint we have
K =
(1 − α)AKα − Tax + τK (α2AKα − δK)
1 + β
− 1




We can now show that if Tax is small and σ is suﬃciently large (e.g. σ > 1 − ε,
with ε being a small number) then an increase in τK leads to a higher steady state
capital stock. The mechanism at work follows the intuition given in Jones and
Manuelli (1992).
Even though we abstract from economic growth, we ﬁnd that young agents
with higher incomes are able to buy more capital stock from the old generation.
Whenever τK increases and government consumption is held constant, then τL will
decrease. This leads to higher income of the young agent (income eﬀect). At the
same time the rate of return on capital decreases (substitution eﬀect). It turns out
that under certain parameter restrictions (small government program, suﬃcient
curvature on preferences), an increase in capital tax increases the capital stock.
When in addition, the discount factor β is small enough and the utility function
has enough curvature e.g. σ > 2, the welfare maximizing capital tax rate is positive.
As agents strongly prefer their ﬁrst period consumption to their second period
consumption and the smoothing motive is strong enough (e.g. σ > 2), it is welfare
increasing to tax interest income and shift wealth into the ﬁrst period.12 Again we
12In an additional appendix to their paper which is available on their website, Conesa, Kitao
and Krueger (forthcoming) show that in a similar model (the only diﬀerence is that old agents
have labor income as well) with inelastic labor supply and homogenous agents, the optimal capital
tax rate is positive. In the absence of Government debt, they then show that the optimal capital
tax is not zero and that the ﬁrst best solution (Planner’s Solution) cannot be achieved. If debt is
introduced the optimal capital tax rate becomes zero and the planner’s solution can me achieved
by a competitive market.
22abstract from transitions. Accounting for transitional eﬀects the direction of the
welfare eﬀect is less clear, since the current old generation would suﬀer an income
loss from a higher capital tax without beneﬁting from the higher capital stock.
In our more general model, we can now show that if one increases the discount
factor β, the optimal capital tax rate decreases (compare model M3b in table 8).
When we further increase β, the rational for a positive optimal capital tax dis-
appears in this simpliﬁed version of our model.13 Since our more general model
includes transfer payments to the young — and Jones and Manuelli (1992) have
already shown that such transfers are welfare improving — we have a further jus-
tiﬁcation for raising additional tax revenue in the optimum. This is the reason
why we cannot ﬁnd any speciﬁcation for our more general model that leads to zero
capital taxes.
Some more intuition can be gained by noting that in our model the young
generation is taxed via a labor tax and the old generation is taxed via a capital
tax only. Since it has been shown in the literature that it is optimal to tax income
at diﬀerent ages at diﬀerent tax rates (e.g. Garriga (2000), and Erosa and Gervais
(2002)) we now see that the only way to achieve some sort of intergenerational
equality is by taxing the old generation as well. However, in our model we assume
the old generation is not working anymore so that the only way to tax the old is
via the capital tax. This provides a further justiﬁcation for a positive capital tax
rate.14
6.2 Labor Elasticity and Income Heterogeneity
Under income heterogeneity (models M2 and M6) the change from elastic labor
supply to inelastic labor supply leads to a labor tax rate of 100%. The optimal
policy is the attempt to achieve as much agent homogeneity as possible. Since
labor taxes become de facto lump sum taxes, it is optimal to tax the entire wage
income and redistribute it back equally to all young agents.
If we abstract from heterogeneity and leave labor inelastically supplied (M4
and M8) we ﬁnd that a negative tax on labor disappears. And depending on the
curvature of preferences the capital tax either stays at 100% or drops down to
43.6%. Model M4 for instance can use a labor tax of 35.7% together with a capital
tax of 58.4% and redistribute exclusively to the young (λ = 1) to achieve maximum
aggregate welfare.
13More detailed results on this toy version of the model are available upon request from the
author.
14If we allowed the old generation to work as well and in addition we would allow an age
speciﬁc labor tax rate, then it would be possible for the capital tax rate to be zero. In this
case the progressivity of the labor tax rate would achieve the optimally feasible intergenerational
equality and capital tax would not be needed anymore. This result has been analytically derived
in the technical appendix to Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (forthcoming).
236.3 Additively Separable Preferences in Consumption and
Leisure
Cases with separable preferences use the form of
a1 lnct + a2 lnlt + β lnct+1,
where we set parameters a1 = a2 = 1
2. Results are reported in the lower parts of
table 8. Some results in the literature on optimal taxation point to the fact that
additive separability in preferences between consumption and leisure can lead to
an optimal capital tax rate of zero (e.g. Ordover and Phelps (1979)). We do not
ﬁnd these results in our overlapping generations framework. The earlier results
of a nonzero capital tax rate with non-additive Cobb-Douglas preferences still
hold under separability. However, we also see that separable preferences exclude
late redistribution completely under all speciﬁcations of heterogeneity and labor
elasticity.
7 Conclusion
We derived simple two-period OLG models with endowment heterogeneity under
ﬁve policy regimes, (i) no redistribution, (ii) early redistribution to the young
generation ﬁnanced by taxes on wage income of the current young generation,
(iii) early redistribution to the young generation ﬁnanced by taxes on interest
income of the current old generation,(iv) late redistribution to the old generation
ﬁnanced by taxes on wage income of the current young generation, and (v) late
redistribution to the old generation ﬁnanced by taxes on interest income of the
current old generation.
We furthermore split the population into diﬀerent income groups and ﬁnd that
high income households fare best under the benchmark model, whereas very low
income households can improve welfare under various redistribution regimes. Low
income households seem to do better under late redistribution, if tax rates are not
too high. Output is highest under the early redistribution regime with intergen-
erational ﬁnancing (savings tax on the old). Optimal tax policy points towards a
non-zero tax on capital and an emphasis on early redistribution.
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(Thousands of 1986 Dollars)
Model
(lognormal)
0 − 2 217 260
2 − 10 355 358
10 − 20 433 444
20 − 30 515 516
30 − 40 565 582
40 − 50 665 648
50 − 60 735 719
60 − 70 814 801
70 − 80 911 903
80 − 90 1,028 1,050
90 − 98 1,305 1,302
98 − 100 1,734 1,794
Table 1: Source Column Two: Fullerton and Rogers (1993)
8 Appendix: Tables and Figures
29Tax Revenue Fiscal Year 2004: in Billions of $
(3,029 represents $ 3,029,000,000,000)
United States, total: $3,029
Federal Tax Income $2,019
Individual income tax $990
withheld by employers $747
Employment tax $717
Old-age and disability insurance $706
Unemployment insurance $7
Railroad retirement $4
Corporation income tax $231
Estate and gift tax $26
Excise tax $55
State and Local Taxes $1,010
Property $318
Individual income tax $215
Corporation income $34
Sales and gross receipt $361
Motor vehicle licenses $21
Death and gift $6
other $56
Source for State and Local:
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/state_local_govt_ﬁnances_employment.html
Source for Federal:http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0„id=168610,00.html
Table 2: Tax Revenue 2004
30Tax Split into Labor and Capital Tax: in Billions of $
(2,415 represents $ 2,415,000,000,000)
Total Tax Revenue, excl. consumption taxes $2,415
Labor Tax
Federal:
Individual income tax (employer) $747
Individual income tax (employee) $122
Employment tax $717
State:
Individual income tax (state) $215




Individual income tax (employee) $122
Corporation income Tax $231
Estate and gift tax $26
State:
Property tax $318
Corportation income tax $34
Death and gift tax $6
Capital income tax revenue: $615
(in %) 25%
Source for State and Local:
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/state_local_govt_ﬁnances_employment.html
Source for Federal:http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0„id=168610,00.html
Table 3: Shares of labor tax revenue and capital tax revenue as percentage of total
tax revenue excluding consumption, sales and excise taxes.
31Government Expenditures Fiscal Year 2004: in Billions of $
(2,293 represents $ 2,293,000,000,000).
United States, total: $4,127
Federal Spending $2,293
Social Security $496







Hospital and medical care for veterans $22
Health resources and services $6
Substance abuse and mental health services $3
Health care tax credit $0
Uniformed Services retiree health care fund $5
Housing assistance $31
Food and nutrition assistance $46
Foodstamps $35
Child nutrition and special milk programs $11
Public assistance $112
Earned income tax credit $33
Supplemental security income $31
Daycare and foster care $11
other $36
Other payments to individuals $12
Education, training, employment and social services $88
Elementary and secondary $34
Higher education $25
Research and general education aid $3
Training and employment $8
Social services $16
others (less transfers to State/Local) $408
State and Local Spending (net of federal funds) $1,834
Education (net of federal funds) $584
Elementary and secondary $393
Higher education $154
Other education $37
Public Welfare (net of federal funds) $118
Health and Hospitals (net of federal funds) $137
Utility & liquore store Expenditure $160




Source for State and Local:
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/state_local_govt_ﬁnances_employment.html
Source for Federal:http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0„id=168610,00.html
Table 4: Government Transfers
32Selected Government Spending in 2004: in Billions of $
(1,955 represents $1,955,000,000,000)






Health other (69%) $23
Housing assistance (66.6%) $21
Foodstamps (91%) $32
Child nutrition $11
Earned income tax credit $33
Daycare and foster care $11
Higher education $25
Research and general education aid $3









Federal employees retirement $117
Medicaid (31%) $55
Health other (31%) $10
Uniformed services retiree health care fund $5
Housing assistance (33.4%) $10
Foodstamps (9%) $3
State:
Public welfare/hospitals/health (31%) $79
Employee retirement $138
Residual Government spending $2,172
Total government expenditures $4,127
Size of selected spending as fraction of GDP 17%
Size of total government spending as fraction of GDP 35%
Early transfers in percent of total selected spending (λ) 38%
Late transfers in percent of total selected spending (1 − λ) 62%
Source for State and Local:
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/state_local_govt_ﬁnances_employment.html
Source for Federal:http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0„id=168610,00.html
Table 5: Government Transfers divided into transfers to the young and the old.
33Parameters Source/Moment to match
Preferences
Inv. of elast. of substitution σ = 2.5 to match K/Y and r
Time preference β = 0.94 to match K/Y and r
Consumption preference a1 = 0.43
to match lifetime
labor supply %L




Total factor productivity A = 3.1834
to normalize wages
w = 1
Capital share in production α = 0.36
0.30 − 0.36
are standard values
(e.g. Kydland and Prescott (1982))
Annual discount rate δ = 8%
5.9% − 12% in
Nadiri and Prucha (1996)
Ability Distribution
Log of lifetime income   = 13.43 (˜$683,000)
Fullerton and Rogers (1993)
and own calculations
Stand. dev. of lifetime income σ = 0.415
Lowest lifetime income θ = 0.004 (˜$10,000)
Highest lifetime income ¯ θ = 121 (˜$5.000,000)
Policy Parameters
Wage income tax rate τL = 27.0% to match VR and %τL
Capital tax rate τK = 15.5% to match VR and %τL
Targeting parameter b = 0.20
Max late transfer a = 0.22 (˜$364,307)
Share of early redistribution λ = 38%




Annual interest rate r = 4.1% 4%in NIPA accounts
Capital output ratio K/Y = 2.66
2.7 − 3 are standard from
NIPA accounts
Average Lifetime Labor Supply %L = 0.364
0.374 in
Gomes, Kotlikoﬀ and Viceira (2007)
Percent of labor tax revenue %τL = 74.5%
75% in U.S. Stat.Abstr. 2004
& own calculations
Percent of capital tax revenue %τK = 25.5%
25% in U.S. Stat.Abstr. 2004
& own calculations
Size of redistribution V R = 22%
22% in U.S. Stat.Abstr. 2004
& own calculations








a b τL τK λ
U.S. yes yes 0.22 0.20 27% 15.5% 0.38
Optimal Policy Parameters
Non-separable utilities:
M1 yes yes 0.34 1.05 30.6% 100% 0.85
M1b : β = 0.985 yes yes 0.61 1.11 35.2% 100% 0.73
M2 yes no − − 100% 100% 1
M3 no yes − − −100% 73% 1
M3a : τL ≥ 0 no yes − − 0% 79.9% 1
M3b : β = 0.985 no yes − − −100% 48% 1
M4 no no − − 85% 100% 1
Additively separable utilities:
M5 yes yes − − 37.7% 83.0% 1
M6 yes no − − 100% 43.6% 1
M7 no yes − − −100% 62.9% 1
M7a : τL ≥ 0 no yes − − 0% 52.1% 1
M8 no no − − 8.8% 43.6% 1
Table 8: Optimal Steady State Tax Policies. Model M5 is run with only a late
redistribution program in place, so that λ is ﬁxed exogenously to equal zero.































































Figure 1: Lifetime Income Distribution. Fitted Log Normal and Gamma distri-
butions. Soruce of mean lifetime income data per deciles: Fullerton and Rogers
(1993).























































































Figure 2: Steady State Results for Transfer Programs of Variable Size.































































Figure 3: Aggregate Welfare and Welfare of the Poorest Household









































































































































Figure 4: Welfare per Income Quartile
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Figure 5: Steady State Results for Diﬀerently Targeted Late Transfer Programs
and Size Adjusted Early Transfer Programs.


























































Figure 6: Aggregate Welfare and Welfare of the Poorest Household



































































































































Figure 7: Welfare per Income Quartile
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